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YOU CAN’T REMAIN NEUTRAL ON A MOVING TRAIN
MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN THE STATES & IRELAND: THOUGHTS ON FREEDOM
TO MARRY, RELIGIOUS HETERONORMATIVITY AND CONCEPTIONS OF
EQUALITY1
Kris McDaniel-Miccio2
This title, in part, was one of the famous phrases uttered by the brilliant historian Howard
Zinn, a wonderful image that applies to advocating social justice. In the United States, the train
referenced by Zinn was the Freedom Train, whether it be toward gender, racial or ethnic parity.
Now it is the Freedom to Marry Train and it has not only left the station, it is moving at breakneck speed and almost unstoppable. This Train built with the blood, sweat and tears of the
LGBTI community, forged by fire and situated on a justified track. There is no difference
between this train and the 1964 Freedom Train: both are about freedom and equality and both
demand that we climb aboard, or as Zinn reminds, be left behind in the dust of inequity.
Since 2013, thirty-seven states extended marriage to lesbian and gay couples and in June
of 2015, the United States Supreme Court held that marriage was a fundamental right not to be
1

Parts of this article that discuss J. Scalia’s opinions were first published by the author, in a previous 2015 article;
an article that critiques the Justice’s opinions in key cases that address homosexuality. See Kris McDaniel-Miccio,
Tzadek, Tzadek Thou Shalt Pursue: A Critique of Justice Scalia's Opinions in Romer, Lawrence & Windsor, 21
CARDOZO J. GEN. & LAW __ (2015).
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restricted to heterosexual couples. Because of the Court’s ruling, marriage equality was now the
rule in all fifty states and not the exception.
In the European Union, the tiny nation-state of Éire passed a marriage referendum that
not only challenged the pre-eminence of the Catholic Church, but also of religious conservatism
and its dominance over family, constitutional law, and policy. In an historic vote, 62% of Irish
voters rejected the NO campaign’s heterosexist definition of marriage, and Ireland became the
first country to pass a constitutional amendment extending marriage equality to all citizens. Yet,
the struggle is not over; rather, it has just begun in both the United States and in Ireland. Indeed,
the forces that reduced sexual minorities to less than second class citizens are waging a battle
that they believe essential to the survival of not only the primacy of Christianity but of Western
Civilisation itself.
In the U.S., the institution of “religious liberty” legislation and laws to repeal LGBTI
protection coupled with Citizens United and the Hobby Lobby decision, have given much needed
traction to the anti-LGBTI movement. While Ireland has not experienced a continued assault
upon the rights of the LGBTI community, it is just a matter of time before there is a crack in the
constitutional foundation that supports equality. Thus, this article will examine the issues that
have framed divergent opinions on sexuality and marriage. Moreover, it shall decode the lexicon
and examine the politics and legal theories of the NO position in both jurisdictions. Unlike
Ireland, activists in the U.S. have used the courts; thus, U.S. Supreme Court cases that address
homosexuality and same sex marriage will be analyzed. Because Justice Scalia was the leader of
the opposition on the Court, deconstructing his opinions will provide much needed insight into
the theoretical basis for the “no” side of the Court and oppositional politics in America.
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I.

IRELAND: A COLLISION OF CULTURE AND HETERODOXY
Religion and religious canon has not been a voice, a position or a critic in the struggle for

equality in Ireland. Indeed, it has been the bulwark of constitutional, case, and statutory law,
drowning and driving out the voices of opposition from the public square. Yet the primacy of
the Church was not always the case: four minutes after noon on April 24th 1916, Patrick Pearse
read the Proclamation from the steps of the GPO:3
The Republic guarantees religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal
opportunities of all its citizens, and declares its resolve to pursue the happiness
and prosperity of the whole nation and of all its parts, cherishing all the children
of the nation equally, and oblivious of the differences carefully fostered by an
alien government, which have divided a minority in the past (emphasis added).4
The Proclamation did not condition full citizenship rights on one’s sex, sexual identity, or
sexual orientation. Indeed, biology was neither destiny nor a disqualifier for the rights and
privileges that are constitutive of citizenship. The Free State responded to the inequality of
oppression by enshrining civil liberty and equality in its founding document. And religion? It
was a liberty, not the liberty.5 By 1937, the repositioning of religion would change and affect the
legal personage of women and sexual minorities.
Since the 1950s, the personhood of the individual homosexual as a rights-holding
member of the state has been subordinate to religious notions of what constitutes morally
acceptable behaviour. Homosexual qua homosexual was once defective and deformed or, in
traditional Christian lexicon, an abomination before G-d6 and the State. Indeed, until the late

3

FEARGHAL MCGARRY, THE RISING, IRELAND: EASTER 1916 (Oxford 2010)
MCGARRY, supra note 3
5
It is interesting to note that in the U.S., Republican candidates for the Presidency believe that religious liberty is the
core liberty or most fundamental liberty. As Ted Cruz has remarked, without religious liberty all other liberties
would fall. This is not only a distortion of the Bill of Rights, but of the founders’ beliefs concerning religion in
general and religious liberty in particular.
6
As both a Jew and a Rabbi, I do not spell out G-d as is our religious and cultural tradition. This tradition comes
from the belief that the ineffable One cannot be captured either in word or in image; hence, anthropomorphic
character of the Divine is inappropriate.
4
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20th Century the psychological community categorized homosexuality as a psychological
disorder, while the Church taught that homosexuality was “the love that dare not speak its
name.”7 This view of same-sex love or intimate expression was grafted onto law and infused
into both cultural lexicon and beliefs.
Sodomy laws existed in Ireland as well as in the U.S.

Such laws were enforced

primarily against the gay and lesbian community even when the statutory lexicon was gender
neutral. Cultural selective enforcement translated into legal selective enforcement, violating
basic tenants of due process.8
Gender inequality, specifically heterosexism, not only framed sodomy prosecution, but
also conceptions of marriage and family.

In Ireland, the 1937 Constitution created a

constitutional provision that appropriated women’s wombs as reproductive instruments.9 With
inclusion of §41 in the 1937 Irish Constitution, acceptable roles for women were reduced to child
bearer and child-rearer. The public sphere, with its rights and responsibilities, was closed to
women based on an accident of birth.
Marriage was defined as between one man and one woman, drawing upon cultural
beliefs that are synonymous with religious canon. Heterosexuality was the sine qua non of
marriage and family. Moreover, it is such conceptions of marriage and family, charted along

7

See ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION (W. W. NORTON &
COMPANY 1995)
8
Ireland prosecuted gays and lesbians up until 1993. Selective enforcement of gender-neutral criminal sodomy
laws was part of American case law. Indeed, in 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court placed its imprimatur on what every
law student learns is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Bowers involved a
challenge to Georgia’s criminal sodomy laws that were in fact gender neutral. A heterosexual couple joined
Hardwick, who was homosexual, in the challenge. Because the case was brought against the State of Georgia, it
was heard in federal court. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia non-suited the heterosexual
couple because the Court believed the chance of heterosexual prosecution would be infinitesimal. The U.S.
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this decision while the U.S. Supreme Court chose not to address the
matter. See Bowers v Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See also, Tzadek, Tzadek Thou Shalt Pursue: A Critique of
Justice Scalia's Opinions in Romer, Lawrence & Windsor supra note 1, at 1.
9
IR. CONST. 1937, art. 41
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axes of sexual and gender domination, which prohibited homosexuality and same-sex marriage.
There is no question that Roman Catholicism and fundamentalist Protestantism have been
ruminating and posting edicts, canons, and dogma on issues particular to sexuality and marriage.
With that said, however, there exists a rather schizophrenic view of sexuality and marriage,
especially if one examines the writings of Augustine. Augustine had a rather dim view of sex,
even within marriage.10 Indeed, a moral as well as theological precept defined sexual desire as
the progenitor of sin and sinfulness. Augustine created an exception, however; sex was moral
only if engaged in for the purpose of procreation. Other Catholic theologians such as Aquinas
not only followed Augustine regarding the notion of proper or moral sex, but in his belief about
the function and moral foundation of women. Females were lesser beings, useful only for the
purpose of procreation, and nothing more. They were, “defective and misbegotten,” and, “utterly
useless, if one excludes the function of bearing children.”11 The traditional view of women in
Catholic dogma was that of reproductive instrument.
Irish natural law theorists tie their abhorrence to sex qua sex, and thereby homosexuality,
to Aquinas, derivatively to Augustine of Hippo, and the writings of Paul VI, John Paul II, and
Benedict.12 It is interesting to note that the opponents to the Irish Marriage Equality Referendum
based their objections on the notion that sex, as “natural” procreative conduct, should only take
place within heterosexual marriage.13 This raises some serious questions about “fighting an

10

Judith Chelius Stark, ed., FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE (Univ. of Penn. Press, 2007).
See THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. See also ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GD (ABRIDGED EDITION 1958)
12
John Finnis, Law, Morality and “Sexual Orientation,” in JUSTICE: A READER, Michael Sandel (ed.) (Oxford
University Press, 2007); Encyclical Letter of Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, [Of Human Life], (July 25, 1968); cf.
Winnipeg Statement, Canadian Bishops Statement in Response to Humanae Vitae, (Sept. 27. 1968) (arguing against
the conclusions of the Church concerning reproduction and birth control). See also POPE JOHN PAUL II, MEMORY
AND IDENTITY: CONVERSATIONS AT THE DAWN OF A MILLENNIUM (RIZZOLI 2005) (“It is legitimate and necessary to
ask oneself if this [same-sex marriage] is not perhaps part of a new ideology of evil, perhaps more insidious and
hidden, which attempts to pit human rights against the family and against man.”).
13
See Charter of the Rights of the Family, Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (October 22, 1983)
11

5

enemy with outposts in [one’s] mind.” The footprints from the “no” vote to Aquinas and
Augustine’s conceptions of moral, sacred, and proper sex and marriage raise an important
question for fifty percent of the Irish population.

Do opponents also cleave to views about

women and their role in the family? And for conservative women, does their political alignment
with the “no” position reinforce stereotypes of women that challenge personhood?14
Of equal importance is the No camp’s view of homosexuality. Such attitudes influence
political and cultural views of homosexuality in general and homosexuality in particular. Studies
indicate two perspectival positions that frame oppositional views of homosexuality: first, gay
male relationships constitute the category, “homosexual,” excluding any reference to women and
lesbianism. Second, gay relationships require that one male partner assume the role of the
female during sexual intimacy and home life.

Because maleness is culturally and legally

privileged, taking on the alleged “female” role may be a source of revulsion because it rejects
masculinity while distorting maleness.
In Ireland, the Iona Institute is an example of a Christian organisation with a
sophisticated political apparatus that has shaped the NO campaign in Irish society. It has crafted
an anti-same-sex marriage platform that closely resembles Catholic encyclicals and pastoral
letters of the Popes.

An interesting characteristic of the Irish “no” position is its ideological

connection to the anti-same-sex marriage movement in the United States. Both jurisdictions
claim: (1) marriage is solely for the purpose of procreation; (2) the mother and father familial
unit is the most suitable environment for children; (3) the male and female dyad conforms to
ancient, biblical, and best iteration of family and; (4) a gender diverse marriage dyad is the
cornerstone of Western Civilization.

14

IR. CONST. 1937, art. 41.1

6

During lead-up to the May 22nd Referendum, opponents of same sex marriage crafted a
mantra that linked procreation with proper aspects of childrearing. Childrearing was the domain
of the family headed by a biological mother and father. Further, opponents such as the Iona
Institute and Mothers and Fathers Matter claimed that the heterosexual dyad was the most
beneficial environment for raising children. Consequently, constitutional protection should only
be afforded if the familial constellation is rooted in heteronormativity.
Unlike the United States, Ireland has created constitutional families.15

Applying a

heteronormative yardstick, only families with a father and mother are considered inviolate and
accorded special rights and protections. Rights inure to the familial unit, not to individuals
within the family. As a result, Irish families headed by a single parent, grandparents, or gay and
lesbian parents fall outside the ambit and concern of the law and public policy.16

Thus, the

marriage of moral religious theology with conceptions of heteronormativity creates nearly an
insuperable chasm between equality for gay and lesbian couples wishing to marry.
So how did the YES vote prevail?
Instead of using the courts, which would have been a barren preference, the Marriage
Equality (ME) movement supported a constitutional amendment that would involve all citizens
throughout the Republic. ME built a grassroots movement that went door-to-door throughout the
country, organised rallies, meet and greet coffee hours, and debates during the last six months of
the eighteen-month campaign. They also organised student groups who then planned debates,
meetings, and public lectures on equality and religion at university.

The YES Equality

movement contested misinformation proffered by Iona and Mothers and Fathers Matter through
15

IR. CONST. 1937, art. 41.1
It is interesting to note that preservation of the heterosexual family is a key government interest. A Constitutional
Referendum on the Child, comparable to child protective legislation in the U.S., had both a difficult time, low voter
turnout and, when it passed, did not take effect for two years. By granting the state quasi parens patria, the inviolate
position of the family was viewed as compromised and threatened.

16
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production of data on the welfare of children, the connection between religion and
heterosexuality, and by debunking the idea that marriage is primarily about producing and
rearing children. And they did this by not devolving into name-calling or engaging in senseless
attacks on proponents of the status quo. The ME contingency reduced the decibel level in
debates, broadcasts and media. This, however, was not true for the NO campaign; rather their
tactics mirrored the often insolent, tough and polarized position of the religious right in the
United States. The ME campaign took to the streets and its success was overwhelming.
One last thought. Ireland was a profoundly Catholic country. It is no longer. This is due
in large measure to the sexual abuse of children in the care of the Church, as well as the
indentured servitude of pregnant women and young girls in the Magdalena Laundries. The Irish
felt betrayed by a Church that had a hand in structuring a rigid civil society and in dictating
private lives. As many a newscaster, commentator and the Archbishop noted, this was a vote as
much against the Church as it was for equality.
II.

THE UNITED STATES: THE RELIGIOUS TRUMP CARD AND THE
DEVOLVEMENT OF EQUALITY
In the United States, pundit and politician alike believe that separation of Church and

State is axiomatic. Indeed, members of the Tea Party (and Fox News) hold fast to the notion that
an insuperable and perilous chasm exists between Church and State,17 and that peril lies in the
land that spurns G-d. Yet, much like our cousins across the pond, American Jurisprudence is rife

17

See Prachi Gupta, 9 reasons Fox News thinks there’s a war on Christmas, SALON,
http://www.salon.com/2013/12/24/9_reasons_fox_news_thinks_theres_a_war_on_christmas/, See also, Stephanie
Mencimer, The Coming Tea Party Civil War, MOTHER JONES http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/11/teaparty-civil-war (… a few weeks earlier, Mark Meckler, TPP's national coordinator, appeared at a conference
sponsored by Ralph Reed's Faith and Freedom Coalition. There, Meckler told the religious right assembled foot
soldiers that he believed the real animating force behind the tea party movement was opposition to the separation of
church and state and the ‘removal of God from the public square.’ One of the group's newest board members is the
former Oklahoma Republican congressman Ernest Istook, a stalwart of the Christian right.”).
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with references to the “Creator,” “Divine Ordinance,” and other euphemisms for G-d or a god.18
While we claim there has been neither the establishment of a state nor government religion, our
jurisprudential history not only contests such a claim but directly contravenes it. Tea Party
protestations to the contrary, the U.S. has operated as a Christian country in both law and
cultural practice.19
Such adherence to a religious politic has had a devastating effect on the LGBTI
community, women, children, and the family.20 The presence of religion in law and culture has
limited access to occupations,21 permitted appropriation of women’s bodies,22 denied a voice and
presence in the body politic,23 and eliminated women’s personhood and agency. With reference
to the LGBTI community, religion has framed laws that criminalized the homosexual, and
permitted open and notorious discrimination in housing, employment, and the military.
Moreover, culturally, a blind eye was turned on violence perpetrated against gay men, lesbians,
transgendered persons in the same way as cases of martial rape and male intimate violence.
What linked the material base of women and LGBTI oppression was gender inequality.

18

Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872); State v. Black, 60
N.C. 266 (1864).
19
We will often read that our country was founded on Judeo-Christian principles. I beg to differ. The parsing of
Torah or Tanakh by Christians, specifically fundamentalist Christians, ignores and obfuscates the rich interpretive
writings, wrestling and struggle of the ( צַדִּיקtsaddiq) – (just, righteous), regardless of whether written in Talmud,
Mishnah or current theological tracts.
20
See generally JULIET MITCHELL, WOMEN’S ESTATE (Penguin 1972); ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY:
THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 35 (Oxford
Univ. Press, 1987).
21
See generally Bradwell, 83 U.S. 130. See also Muller, 208 U.S. 412.
22
Bradley v. State, 2 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 158 (1824). The Mississippi Supreme Court held that husbands would
not be prosecuted if they beat their wives with a stick no thicker than the diameter of their thumb. In effect,
husbands had the right to use physical force as a means to control their wives’ behavior. The question that triggered
state action and judicial inquiry was the amount of force used—hence it was excessive force that was actionable, not
the use or threatened use of force. See also State v. Black, 60 N.C. 266 (1864) overruled by Harris v. State, 71 Miss.
462 (1894); People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152 (1984)(marital rape exemption); See generally Merton v. State, 500
So. 2d 1301(1986); Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123 (1981).
23
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (ratified August 18, 1920). Cf. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162,173 (1875) (holding
that while Virginia Minor was a U.S. citizen the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not confer a right to vote and
state restrictions that limited voting to a specific gender, age, or class was not a violation of either the Privileges and
Immunities Clause or the relatively new Fourteenth Amendment.).
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While granting religion a niche in the market place of ideas is appropriate and does not
harm conceptions of democracy, allowing it to frame both cultural and legal discourse is not only
dangerous but anti-democratic. It is dangerous because it presumes moral certitude when such
certitude is improper, and it is anti-democratic because it marginalizes spiritual, religious, or
humanistic iterations of morality that are disfavored or outside the bounds of what is perceived to
be “acceptable.” HLA Hart was correct when he denounced the moral inevitability of Lord
Devlin’s prohibition against prostitution and homosexuality.24 Devlin’s position, not unlike
Burger’s concurrence in Bowers, Brewer’s opinion in Muller, or the State of Virginia’s brief in
Loving, was grounded in the “inerrant word of G-d,” situated within Christian theocratic notions
of Divine will. For Hart, the problem was not that Devlin and others held religious beliefs, but
that such beliefs structured law and formed the sole basis for morality.25 To Hart the danger was
not in the details it was the detail.
In American jurisprudence, there are footprints to the same source as the one commented
on by Hart in 1950s England. Politically, the Bible as authority for law and policy is very much
alive in the fifty states framing condemnation of same-sex marriage, abortion, and continued
mulishness in the face of religious diversity and moral beliefs. Moral certainty in scriptural
imperatives supplants justice and, as Hart reminds, laws from this source require no justification
or rationale other than it “is morally right,” which, translated means, “scripturally consonant not

24
25

See generally H. L. A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963).
Id.
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designed to identify and counteract state laws likely to be unconstitutional because of their
treatment of religion.”26
Indeed, the confluence of Citizen’s United with Hobby Lobby creates an environment
where religious claims usurp equality. Since the Supreme Court decision in Obergefell, states
have enacted legislation that would enable vendors to claim a First Amendment violation if
having to serve, sell, or deliver goods to the LGBTI community. By invoking “strongly held”
religious beliefs, individuals may withhold services and goods from the community, and it is
quite possible that such discrimination could extend to other minorities.
What is fascinating about the current political climate is how it parallels claims made in
the era prior to the establishment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA). During Jim Crow,
houses of worship, private and public companies and sole vendors denied access and service to
African-Americans. This precipitated the counter sit-ins throughout the South, as well as the
Birmingham bus boycott let by Martin Luther King. The 1964 CRA eradicated inequality based
on race, and subsequently sex, by creating a federal legislative scheme that made discriminatory
conduct in public accommodation unconstitutional. The CRA included a religious exemption
but only for religious institutions. Individual members of the public were not empowered to

26

MARCI A. HAMILTON AND EDWARD R. BECKER, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2007),
and GOD V. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF EXTREME RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2014). In Hamilton and Becker’s writings,
they analyze the religious basis for law finding it to be deleterious to conceptions of democracy. In their newest
publication, they sound an alarm in relation to the Hobby Lobby case argued before the U.S. Supreme Court in April
2014. In Hobby Lobby, the appellants, fundamentalist Christians and owners of a chain of stores that employed in
excess of 25,000 workers, challenged the Affordable Care Act’s requirement that insurance cover contraception.
Appellants argued that such a requirement violated their First Amendment right to express their religious beliefs. In
City of Boerne v Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, found that Congress
exceeded section 5 enforcement power in the enactment of Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) as applied
to the states. While this was important, the explanation in Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion is even more
interesting and clearly outlines the problem with unfettered exercise of religious beliefs by individuals: “RFRA is
not a proper exercise of Congress’ §5 enforcement power because it contradicts vital principles necessary to
maintain separation of powers and the federal-state balance.”
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invoke a First Amendment claim of religious liberty to refuse service to anyone on the basis of
race or sex.
The distinction made in the 1964 CRA between religious institutions and religious beliefs
of individuals seems to be important; they are however a difference without a distinction.

By

creating an exemption, it opened the door for Hobby Lobby. In terms of commerce, Catholic,
Evangelical, and Orthodox Jewish adoption agencies, hospitals, and care facilities are no
different from individuals who run such organisations. What triggers the withholding of services
or goods is a religious belief, canon, or stricture. Seemingly, such beliefs guide the actions of
individuals as well as institutions. Thus, religious exemption in 1964 via the CRA and again in
the 1990’s via RFRA, created a potential constitutional confrontation between religious liberty
and equality claims. Citizens’ United’s ruling that “corporations are people too” for purposes of
the First Amendment, not only opened the floodgates for a tsunami of funding by corporations to
political candidates, but raised the specter that corporations could interpose claims of religious
discrimination. Hobby Lobby is the sine qua non for the religious right because it primatizes
religion whilst distorting conceptions of liberty. Moreover, it blasts a hole in the wall that
separates civil from religious society. What is on the horizon is ominous, not only for equality
but for religious liberty as well. The architects of current legislation that would give a “get out
from under the Constitution card,” for religion is not universal, rather it applies only to those
persons who have “deeply held Christian religious beliefs.” It appears that religious liberty is
not a liberty interest but the liberty interest, and one that is narrowly crafted and trumps equality.
III.

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, OR THE LOVE THAT DARE NOT SPEAK ITS NAME
Justice Scalia is prolific when it comes to constructing an opinion, regardless of whether

it is consonant with the majority or the dissent. The constant, according to Erwin Chermerinsky,

12

is how he created a juridical trajectory that is at once miserly and callous.27 While it would be
interesting and quite entertaining to address Chermerinsky’s observation, the real danger caused
is not Justice Scalia’s tone but rather his legal interpretation of rights, defined by and grounded
in an ideology bound by a conservative politic: a politic that is hostile to women, gay men and
lesbians. It should be noted from the outset, this ideology is inconsistent with the Constitution
and the moral imperatives of dignity and respect embedded within it. Moreover, it denies to this
class of persons their humanity.
On June 26, 2013, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Windsor28 and Perry.29 These long awaited decisions were the death knell to § 3 of the Defense
of Marriage Act and to California’s bar to same sex marriage. Writing for the majority,
Kennedy’s words inscribed into law the dignity promised to all persons by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Additionally, he cautioned states to mind the
admonition that while jurisdictions are empowered to set guidelines pertaining to marriage; such
guidelines must conform to the Constitution. 30 Finally, he stated what every parent and child
knows: denigration of a familial unit or marriage bond is humiliating, not merely to the parties
involved, but the children who are part of the family.31
Justice Scalia objected. His dissent in Windsor tracked the underlying ideology that
structured his opinions in Romer32 and Lawrence.33 As Carlo Pedrioli makes clear, Justice Scalia

27

Erwin Chermerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 UNIV. OF HAWAI’I L. REV. 385
(2012). Other scholars have used such adjectives to describe his opinions; specifically, as they apply to gender
equality or gender issues—unprincipled, inconsistent and ideological to a fault.
28
United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, 570 U.S. ___ (2013)(slip op.); 133 S. Ct. 2675.
29
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
30
U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
31
Id. at 2678.
32
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
33
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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did not adopt advancement of constitutional rights for sexual minorities.34 Rather, his opinions
reinscribed a rights paradigm that protects traditional notions of heterosexuality and sexual
expression. Before deconstructing Justice Scalia’s dissent in Windsor and Obergefell, the key
marriage equality cases of the 21st Century, it is essential to unpack the beliefs that shaped his
position on constitutional recognition and extension of rights to homosexuals, homosexuality,
and same sex marriage.
A. The Pattern Emerges
In Van Orden v Perry,35 religious beliefs seem to structure Justice Scalia’s understanding
of government’s legitimacy as well as the source for human behaviour. Both flow from the
Divine or, more correctly, are constructed by the Divine. During oral argument in Van Orden,36
Scalia opined, “[w]hat the commandments stand for is the direction of human affairs by G-d,”
and the commandments are symbolic of the “fact that government derives its authority from Gd.”37 Yet, this brief window into Scalia’s thinking reveals a rather simplistic, rote, or formulaic
understanding of the G-d, civil society debate. First, his use of the word “fact,” is at once
perplexing and problematic.

Indeed, the existence of a Divine Being is neither provable nor

34

Carlo Pedrioli, Judicial Neutrality Awash with Ideology: Justice Scalia, Sexual Orientation and Rhetorical
Personae, (Sept. 20, 2013)(unpublished comment, on file with the author) available at
http://works.bepress.com/carlo_pedrioli/3/. Pedrioli makes the case that Scalia’s opinions are rife with ideological
positions as opposed to anything approximating judicial neutrality or what some would term “detached objectivity. I
would in fact take issue with Professor Pedrioli regarding his generous use of the term “judicial neutrality,” since
Justice Scalia’s writings are anything but neutral and some would argue devoid of juridical care. For a marvelous
analysis of the lack of judicial temperament or inquiry, see, Chemerinsky, supra, note 28.
35
Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
36
Id.
37
Trans. of Oral Argument, at 16, 23-24, Van Orden v. Perry, No. 03-1500 (March 2, 2005), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-1500.pdf. (“. . . They're saying these basic
principles of human behavior that we're governed by come from God. And that message would be conveyed so long
as you use the terminology of the Ten Commandments. That's what the Ten Commandments stand for . . .”)(“It's a
symbol of the fact that government comes—derives its authority from God. And that is, it seems to me, an
appropriate symbol to be on State grounds.”). The term “religious” encompasses atheist, agnostic, and those who do
not believe in a monotheistic deity.
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disprovable; rather belief in a divinity or Divine architect is a consequence of faith not fact.38
While natural law theorists, such as Lord Devlin, would agree that human rights are endowed by
a Creator, Scalia’s notion of law or legitimacy of (state) authority is highly contested by
theologians.

Indeed, Abraham Joshua Heschel interrogates the supposition that mere faith

comports with Judaism and contests the idea that law, religious or secular, is worthy of uncritical
adherence. Harvey Cox, Hollis Professor of Divinity at Harvard, makes clear that authority
grounded in religious claims or claims of legitimacy derived though scripture or religious canon
are neither legitimate nor authentic.
HLA Hart would find Justice Scalia’s admonition most disturbing because of the moral
certitude that accompanies his assertion. The most troubling aspect of locating the source of
civil, legal or political authority in scripture is its dilution of the First Amendment and shifting of
power from the will of the people to the will of god. This is problematic because it denies the
existence of spiritual pluralism while distorting notions of civil and secular when used to modify
either society or our legal system. Finally, Justice Scalia’s reliance on a divine source for
government’s legitimacy and its authority exceeded permissible notions of using religion or
spiritual beliefs as a guide; here, religion is both foundation and fortification.
Justice Scalia’s juridical views, however, are not shaped solely by his reliance on a
selective reading of Torah39 but rather his penchant for ideological as well as religious dogma

38

See generally, TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, THE PHENOMENON OF MAN, (1965). De Chardin was a Jesuit theologian
and paleontologist who reconciled his faith in the Divine with evolution through “le dedans de la matière” his theory
of the inside of matter-matter has an inner property that propels it spontaneously to organize itself with other matter
into the biosphere and eventually uniting with the Divine. His view of evolution was teleological. The notion of
inner matter should not be confused with the existence of the “soul,” that is another Christian theological belief. Yet
de Chardin does not claim he has proof; rather he has a theory of the unity of god with human, called the Omegapoint, becoming one with the divine. Every Catholic knows the Alpha-Omega distinction—the beginning and the
end. For de Chardin, Omega is an ending, an end to the purely human and into the Divine. See also, ABRAHAM
JOSHUA HESCHEL, GOD IN SEARCH OF MAN: A PHILOSOPHY OF JUDAISM (1976).
39
Justice Scalia’s reliance on scripture or the gospels is, at best, very loose. Indeed, some may even refer to either it
as “cherry-picking,” or cafeteria Christianity. See, Mullins Coal v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation, 484
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contributes to their construction. Starting in 1996, Justice Scalia’s commitment to a conservative
ideology is discernable.

In Romer v Evans,40 the Supreme Court struck down Colorado’s

Constitutional Amendment 2, which invalidated any claim of discrimination by LGB persons. It
further prohibited the establishment, adoption, or enforcement of any “statute, regulation,
ordinance or policy,”41 by any political subdivision of the State of Colorado to, inter alia,
protection of the relationships, conduct, orientation, or practices by or of the LGB community or
individuals.42 The aim of Amendment 2 was to leave lesbians, gay men, and bisexual persons
unprotected against arbitrary discrimination and open to majoritarian “animosity.”43 Unable to
treat discrimination based on sexual orientation as a semi-suspect or suspect class, Justice
Kennedy found that the Amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause because the purpose of
the Amendment failed the rational basis test. 44 Simply put, the objective of the Amendment was
unreasonable.45
Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent, characterized the majority as favoring preferential
treatment for lesbians, gay men, and bisexual persons.46 There was nothing preferential in the
claim by plaintiffs or by the majority. Amendment 2 was crafted with only one goal—to remove
any protection from discrimination regardless of whether state or private actors withheld
employment, housing, or wage-labour benefits based on sexual orientation.

47

Moreover,

U.S. 135 (1989) (upholding Labor Department regulations making it much more difficult for miners to get black
lung benefits); Sullivan v. Stroop, 110 S. Ct. 2499 (1990) (denying needy children a $50 disregard if they receive
Social Security Benefits) See also, Peter Edelmen, Justice Scalia is Wrong About Poverty Law Being ‘Made-Up
Stuff,’ THINKPROGRESS (Access Date, at _PM/AM), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2008/09/19/172360/scaliapoverty/. Justice Scalia’s comments to the Federalist Society where he claimed that poverty law is “made up stuff.”
40
Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
41
Id.at 624
42
Id.
43
Id.at 635
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Romer, 517 U.S. at 638-639 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
47
Id.at 635
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Amendment 2 was in response to various county laws and ordinances that attempted to protect
the LGBT community from rampant discrimination, as well as police arrest avoidance in queerbashing cases. If there was any preferential treatment, it was to protect “majoritarian” notions of
sexual morality.

Indeed, Scalia claims that the raison d’etre for Amendment 2 was quite

properly the protection of sexual morality by the majority.48 In championing moral efficacy of
the majority, Justice Scalia invoked the now discredited ruling and rationale of Bowers v.
Hardwick.49
Bowers was perhaps the most tortured opinion in the Twentieth Century on the rights of
the LGBT community. Forget for a moment that the majority conflated the issue; indeed the
challenged statute was gender neutral, effecting the private sexual practices of heterosexuals as
well as homosexuals.50 Yet the Court truncated the issue to decide only the question of private
expression of intimacy by homosexuals, ignoring the fact that sodomy is a sexual behaviour
engaged in by both straight and gay couples.51 What is instructive is why the Court chose to
examine and rule as it did.

The “why” is attributable to a political reality; admittedly, only

homosexuals were prosecuted while nary a straight couple.

Indeed, one can imagine the

political outcry if the straight community was caught in the police or prosecutorial dragnet
reserved for the likes of Michael Hardwick and his ilk. Thus, in conflating the dual categories
into one, the Court placed its imprimatur on selective prosecution by the State—a clear violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Bowers is much more troubling than reported by either the press or legal scholars because
the Court reinscribes arcane myths about homosexuals and homosexuality. These myths are in

48

Id. at 648.
Id. at 40; See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
50
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
51
Id.
49
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part constructed by religious or biblical interpretations of sexuality. Devoid of any critical
analysis of the cultural iterations of sexual expression, the Court not only espoused but premised
the grant or denial of fundamental rights upon cultural mythology constructed by biblical tome.
Burger opined that the immorality of homosexuality was firmly “rooted in the Judeo-Christian
moral and ethical standards,”52 found in the Bible. I suspect that Justice Burger was referencing
the oft-cited passages from the Book of Leviticus in Torah that invoke conceptions of
sanctification.53 For Burger this is evidence of a legitimate bar of homosexuality that is not only
a tradition within Christianity but Judaism. I trust that Justice Burger, as well as his colleagues
on the bench in 1986, were neither theologians nor historians, and certainly they had no facility
with Torah, the source of the alleged bar. Burger merely grafted this rather odious myth into law
by drawing from what he perceived as common culture.
As for civil society, neither Burger nor Justice White, the author of the majority opinion,
had any knowledge of the rather long history of the acceptance of homosexuality and of
homosexual marriage. According to Professor William Eskridge, same sex relationships in
Ancient Greece were not barred, and in Ancient Rome same sex relationships were afforded the
civil bond of marriage.54

What is striking about Rome, however, is how acceptance of

homosexuality was not confined to males; indeed women married as well.55 Yet, the Court ruled

52

Id. at 196, See, e.g., Levitcus 17:1-26:46; See generally, W. GUNTHER PLAUT ET AL., THE TORACH: A MODERN
COMMENTARY, 654-655 (W. Gunther Plaut ed., 2006) As the commentator in The Torah, William Hallo, notes, the
Holiness Code, or the Laws of Sanctification, “may well have once constituted a discrete literary entity,” woven into
Leviticus as illustrated by the author’s use of the word kappēr, atonement, used in chapter 16. Moreover, Bamberger
reminds that many of the laws dealing with sexual conduct in the Torah were part of Near Eastern case law, with
homosexuality addressed in Assyrian laws. Thus, it appears that the authors of this section, as well as others, were
influenced by the cultures found during the period of authorship. Communication between scribe and Divine Being
seems quite unlikely unless that Being was also sharing ideas on sexual purity with Assyrians, Hittites, and
Sumarians. See also Leviticus, 20:10; The Code of Ur-Nammu, § 4; Laws of Eshnunna §28; and The Code of
Hammurabi, §§ 129, 133 (Cases of adultery where both adulterer and adulteress “shall be put to death.”).
53
PLAUT, supra, note 54.
54
See William Eskridge, A History of Same Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1444 (1993).
55
Id. at 1447.
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against Michael Hardwick, and in effect the entire LGBT community, relying upon apologue—
the prohibition’s “ancient roots,” and how homosexuality is an “infamous crime against
nature…a disgrace to human nature…and a crime not fit to be named.”56
The Court will often use the phrase, “conceptions of ordered liberty.” This is shorthand
for not only legal but also cultural tradition. Ordered liberty is the root or at the heart of
numerous Supreme Court decision.
skepticism.

As it should be; but with a measure of caution and

There have been many traditions from our past that the Court disavows; the

dehumanisation of African Americans, the subordination of women and even the heightened
status of contracts. Yet, the majority in Bowers, cleaved to a tradition that was on the cusp of
disfavor, recognising some traditions whilst casting aside others.

Perhaps, Justice Oliver

Wendell Holmes was correct when he stated, “it is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is more revolting of the grounds
upon which it was laid down have long since vanished and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.”57 Blind imitation of the past. Holmes was so correct indeed. It was as if
he reached down and penned the next opinion addressing the privacy rights of homosexuals.
Lawrence v. Texas58 was factually and legally similar to Bowers. Police officers had
entered Lawrence’s apartment based on a “weapons disturbance claim.”

59

Once inside, the

police observed Lawrence and his partner, Garner, in a “sexual act.”60 Both men were arrested
for violating the Texas Penal code61 that prohibited homosexual sodomy.62 Texas criminalized
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Id. at 196-97.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
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Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Id. at 562.
60
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
61
The Code states, “A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person of
the same sex.” Deviate sexual intercourse is defined as, “(a) any contact between any part of the genitals of one
person and the mouth or anus of another or (b) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an
object. Id. at 574.
57
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intimate expression between members of the same sex. Interestingly, the exact same behaviour
can and is performed by members of the opposite sex. Thus, I read this statute as criminalisation
of homosexuality, well aware that critics will claim that the act, not the person, is the focus of the
legislation. Theirs is a rather Machiavellian interpretation because the criminality of the act is
conditioned upon the gender of the persons engaged in the act. Texas, rather clearly, was going
after homosexuality through the criminalisation of private intimate sexual expression by
homosexual couples. The omission of heterosexual non-procreative sexual intimacy is striking
because it seems to suggest that Texas understood that criminalising heterosexual sexual
behaviour was a political landmine as well as a legal nullity. Indeed, Bowers was instructive on
these points.
Once again, Kennedy wrote for the majority, repudiating the “ancient roots” theory, as
well as the interpretation of ordered liberty by the Bowers Court. Kennedy found that reliance
on tradition by the Bowers majority was not only misplaced, but also misapplied.

Kennedy’s

healthy skepticism of Bowers revealed the following: the ancient roots of anti-homosexuality
were in fact incorrect, at the time of Bowers the states were moving away from criminalisation of
homosexual sodomy, and Romer had recognised amendments such as Colorado’s were nothing
more than majoritarian animosity toward a, “specific class of persons.”63 The majority then
administered the one-two punch to the heterosexism of both Bowers and the Texas Penal Code,
overruling the former and finding the latter unconstitutional. 64
Justice Scalia did not join the majority view that laws akin to Texas and opinions such as
Bowers, “demean the lives of homosexual persons.”65 Rather, he penned a dissent, which
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Id. at 563
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Id. at 578.
65
Id. at 575
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incorporated a rigid and flawed interpretation of ordered liberty. Since homosexuality and
homosexual intimate expression were not part of our cultural or legal tradition, constitutional
rights and protection would not extend to LGBT persons. This dissent however went further than
a rigid application of “ordered liberty.” It disaggregated the person from the act, repudiating by
inference, Loving.66
In 1967, the US Supreme Court struck down misigenation laws via the case of Loving v
Virginia.67 Much like the class of cases addressing homosexuals and homosexual intimate
sexual expression, the State of Virginia maintained that prohibition of interracial cohabitation
was constitutional because the statute was neutral, affecting both white persons as well as
persons of color.

Thankfully, the Court rejected this claim by opining, “the fact of equal

application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which the
Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race.”68
The Loving Court continued, “this Court has consistently repudiated ‘[d]istinctions between
citizens solely because of their ancestry’ as being ‘odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality.’"

69

At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause

demands that racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, submit to the "most
rigid scrutiny," and “if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the
accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination.”70
In his dissent, Justice Scalia focused on the act, “homosexual sodomy,” whilst opining
that Texas’ prohibition of such conduct is reasonable. Virginia and Texas’ law involve both
persons as well as conduct. In Loving, we are talking about marriage-the act of marriage and
66

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Id. at 9
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cohabitation – by people across the racial divide. In Lawrence, the law references specific
sexual acts by people within a gender category. Thus, if we apply Justice Scalia’s reasoning in
Lawrence to Loving, it is doubtful he would have joined the majority.71
When reading Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence, I am reminded of the cliché used by
parents and religious folk alike,” Hate the sin, love the sinner.” Both Scalia and my parents
reduce complex notions of the self into rather pedestrian functions. Sometimes an “act” is
indistinguishable from the self or the person. Here, sexual conduct is intimately linked to the
persons performing the act. Moreover, this link is explicit in the statute. Sodomy between
consenting heterosexual couples does not violate the Texas Penal Code.72 Thus disaggregating
“who” from “what” is at once mendacious and dishonest.
In Loving, the Court did not link sex qua sex to a fundamental rights paradigm; rather, the
Court’s concern is the right of individuals to intimately associate by cohabiting through
marriage.73 This is the same for Lawrence. As Justice O’Connor pointed out in her concurrence,
“it is true that the law applies…to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is
closely correlated with being homosexual.

Under such circumstances, Texas' sodomy law

targeted more than conduct; it was directed at LGB [gay] persons as a class.”74 Unlike her
counterpart, Justice O’Connor was on the right track: the Texas statute, as well as Virginia’s,
cordoned off intimate acts because of, not in spite of, the race and gender of the parties. Justice
Scalia chose to ignore this, as well as the systemic inequality incorporated into the Texas antisodomy statute.
71

See Loving, 388 U.S. 1 and Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. ((a) the statute was racially neutral, applying equally to
whites and persons of color; (b) separation of the races was embedded in notions of ordered liberty (long history,
cultural and legal tradition) and not parenthetically (c) certain interpretations of the Bible speak of the divine plan
that separates the race).
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It is however a violation of Leviticus. See Leviticus, 20:10.
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Loving, 388 U.S. at 4.
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Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J. concurring).
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What, then, would he do with Windsor and Obergefell?
B. Justice Scalia’s Dissent in Windsor
1. Procedure as Sword
Admittedly, Windsor raised complex procedural and substantive questions.

Edie

Windsor had filed suit against the federal government because DOMA denied federal recognition
of same sex marriages.75 While New York has had a rather checkered history when it comes to
equality for the LGBT community,76 it changed course in the early 21st Century, finally
extending the fundamental right to marry and equality to same sex couples.77
Windsor and her partner for more than a quarter of a century were married and their
Canadian marriage was recognized by the State of New York.78 Thea Spyer, Edie’s wife, passed
away, leaving Windsor her entire estate.79 As a result, a tax bill generated for $363,000 USD. 80
Windsor was required to pay this tax because under DOMA, she was not recognized as a
surviving spouse and, therefore, subject to the estate tax. 81 Under IRS rules, surviving spouses
are spared the estate tax because the property devolves to the widow or widower. 82 This benefit
was denied to Windsor because DOMA specifically excluded same sex marriages from
recognition and the ensuing federal benefits.83
The case was heard in the District Court for the Southern District, which declared DOMA
unconstitutional.84 The federal government was ordered to issue the tax refund, which it did
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U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013).
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N.Y. CLS Dom. Rel. § 10-a, §10-b, § 13 (West 2013)
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not.85 During pendency of the tax suit, however, the U.S. Attorney General notified the Speaker
of the House of Representatives that under 28 U.S.C. §530 D, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
would no longer defend, as constitutional, §3 of DOMA.86 In response to the notice sent by the
Executive Branch, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) moved to intervene.

87

The

District Court permitted intervention as an interested party.88 Prior to the appeal in the U.S.
Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s
ruling. 89
We know that the Supreme Court found jurisdiction appropriate even with the procedural
twists and turns presented by this case. 90 The majority held that there was in fact a controversy
between the parties and the parties had standing to press their claims in the Second Circuit and
the Supreme Court.91 Two facts satisfied the justicability issue. First, the Government had not
complied with the order to release a refund92 and, second, whilst the Executive Branch would not
defend DOMA, the Government would enforce it.93 This meant that the Executive Branch,
through the DOJ, would not push for or permit remedies such as estate tax credits to devolve to
same sex surviving spouses.
As for the second problem, the issue of standing,94 the Court found that the U.S. did in
fact suffer an injury—the financial cost of the estate tax refund.95 Moreover, an additional injury
resulted—the inability of the federal government to exercise its enforcement powers in the area
85

Id. at 2684.
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Id. at 2684.
88
Id. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
89
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684.
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Id. at 2684.
94
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of revenue collection.96 As the Court noted, standing would not have presented if the Executive
had ordered the IRS to release the refund. 97 It did not.
According to Scalia, because there was neither a justiciable issue nor standing, the suit
should have ended with the issuance of the District Court ruling.98 Scalia seemed to ignore the
ruling in Roper, which stated that appeal from a party “may be permitted on the merits so long as
that party retains a stake in the appeal satisfying the requirements of Article III.”99 Both
Windsor and the federal Government had a stake in the merits. Ms. Windsor because the
Government was choosing to enforce the provisions of DOMA, in particular §3, thus leaving her
bereft of the $363,000 USD taken by the IRS, and the Government if forced to remit the estate
tax refund. 100
Yet, there is something quite troubling about Scalia’s crabbed notion of standing (injury)
and justicability. In Roe v. Wade,101 similar procedural problems were evident. By the time cert
was granted the plaintiff, Norma McCorvey, had given birth.102 Thus, questions involving the
right to privacy, the right to bodily integrity, as well as the constitutionally of anti-abortion
statutes was moot.103 There was no longer “an injury” to plaintiff –“an invasion of a legally
protected interest” because the pregnancy had ended.104 Yet, the Roe Court heard the appeal
because the constitutional issues triggered by anti-abortion statutes would inevitably reoccur.
Perhaps the plaintiff would re-file if she became pregnant again or women in the anti-abortion
96
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100
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)(articulating the requirements of Art. III standing: a
constitutional injury, that is concrete and particularized, imminent or immediate, a causal connection between the
injury and challenged action of the defendant and it must be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.).
97

25

states would seek redress because the criminalization of abortion was widespread. Regardless of
how the issue might reoccur, the Court understood that standing and justiciability (case or
controversy) was present because of the political reality in the late Twentieth Century.
Justice Scalia was not on the Supreme Court bench when Roe was decided. Yet, he was a
very vocal opponent, believing that the Blackmun decision fashions matter out of nothing.

In

Justice Scalia’s world, there is no constitutional right to privacy because it does not appear in the
text. His disdain for the “penumbra” theory, first espoused by Justice Douglas in Griswold, is
well known. Yet, the procedural issues raised in Roe and Windsor do not approximate, much
less rely on, an interpretation of the First, Fourth, or Fourteenth Amendments; rather, they raise
procedural questions a law student would recognize—as most certainly a justice of the United
State Supreme Court. Thus, it is telling that Scalia had a “stack blowing” experience whilst
responding to the Article III issues.
C. Religious Belief as a Shield
Justice Scalia was repelled by not only the procedural questions raised in Windsor, but
also the political and moral issues it placed before the Court. Politically, more flexible thinking
on questions of human sexuality eclipsed the rather antediluvian position of the right wing. Poll
after poll heralded a new day in America, and not one consonant with the right or religious
fundamentalists. The role of the church, specifically the Mormon Church, in funding Prop 8 and
other anti-gay marriage initiatives coupled with the Supreme Court opinion in Citizens United,
contributed to a shift in public opinion. By the time Windsor was argued in March of 2013, the
majority of Americans approved of same sex marriage.
The plaintiffs in Windsor and Perry raised claims rooted in moral imperatives that frame
and embedded in our founding document-the right of every person to dignity and respect. Edie
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Windsor and her co-plaintiffs challenged notions of equality and freedom that had been denied to
a class of persons because of who they were and who they loved.

Not unlike Mildred Jeffries in

Loving,105 the Windsor and Perry plaintiffs placed before the Court the question of whether
dignity and respect embedded in conceptions of liberty and equality were the sole province of the
sexual majority. To this, the majority declared a resounding, “NO.”
And Justice Scalia?
Justice Scalia’s dissent involved three distinct claims. First, he charged the majority with
distorting the Congressional Record concerning the legislative history of DOMA to fit the
conclusion it desired.106

Second, Scalia claimed the Court, opining as it did, reneged on

assurances given in Lawrence specifically, “[Lawrence] has nothing, nothing at all to do with
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexuals seek
to enter.“107 Third, he lamented how, by judicial fiat, the majority traded away the right of the
people to rule themselves through federal or state enactments.108
The dissent employs distortion riddled with political rhetoric and hubris. Indeed, Justice
Posner correctly summed up Justice Scalia’s opinions as, “[O]mitting contrary evidence”109 …
ignoring distinctions and critical [judicial] passages,” and dismissing key facts.110

Posner

characterizes Scalia’s writing as ahistorical and inconsistent with his own canons.111 Indeed,
what structures Scalia’s opinions and influences their outcome are “strongly felt views on such
105
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matters as…, homosexuality.”112

I would amend Justice Posner’s description as follows; the

decisions penned by Scalia reflect strongly held religious and political views.
Now, let us begin dismantling the dissent.
1. Scalia’s First Claim: The Windsor Court Distorted the Congressional Record to
Reach Its Conclusion
Justice Scalia’s first two points combine into a rather interesting claim on his part.
Essentially, he asserts that the majority twisted the legislative record to support the majority’s
belief that DOMA was passed to “demean, to disparage…[to] injure same sex couples, to impose
inequality and to humiliate their children.”

113

To use a Scaliest, this, is nothing but, “argle-

bargle.”114
It is unclear whether Justice Scalia deliberately misrepresented the opinion of the Court
or failed to either understand or account for cause and effect. Throughout the opinion, the Court
uses phrases such as “DOMA’s principal effect,” 115 or “DOMA’s operation in practice,” 116 to
explain the consequences that flow from DOMA. The Court explicitly states that DOMA creates
outcomes that adversely affect children, parents, spouses – families that happen to be linked
through same sex marriage or coupling.

The Court demonstrates how DOMA sets up a

constitutionally offensive caste system that denies to married gay and lesbians couples over one
thousand benefits. Such benefits include veteran’s benefits to army dependent spouses, filing as
joint married couples for federal and state income tax, receipt of government health care benefits,
access to special protections regarding domestic-support obligations under the Bankruptcy Code,
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and the right of burial together in a National Veterans Cemetery.117 The impact on children is
equally discordant because it results in financial insecurity due to the spousal requirements under
Social Security Survivor benefits, federal pensions, and the additional reduction of family
income via taxation of health benefits under domestic partnership or civil union employer or
government plans.118 The Court enumerated the myriad real-life disabilities and burdens created
by DOMA. Yet, the most offensive effect of DOMA is the inequality it structures and the
disrespect it fosters: inequality because it carefully crafts a two-tiered system of recognition
based solely on the gender of the parties to a marriage and disrespect because it telegraphs a
message that gay or lesbian families are not to be given the same benefits or cultural deference as
their heterosexual counterparts.
Scalia not only conceals the palpable reality of DOMA but misrepresents the Court’s
position, as well as the consequences of a federal recognition ban. In essence, by denying
recognition to same sex marriages, Congress disrespected the intrinsic humanity of gay men,
lesbians, and, derivatively, their children. The denial of both equality and dignity rings true not
merely because of a social caste-system erected by DOMA and supported by Scalia, but because
of the decision in Loving. Loving is not about sex nor is it about religious marriage; rather, it is
about the recognition of the commitment through civil marriage between a man and a woman
who happen to be from two different racial classifications. 119 Moreover, Loving articulates the
fundamental nature of intimate association, through marriage, that is authentically human. Edie
Windsor and Thea Spyer participated in an authentically human act recognized by the State of
New York but rejected by their country of origin.
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Finally, whilst not articulating a fundamental right to marry that covers homosexuals, the
Windsor Court nonetheless brought the plaintiffs under a discernable part of the Loving decision.
First, the Fourteenth Amendment protects dignity of persons and their intimate sexual
association and second, neither should be debased by majoritarian disapproval.

Thus, Justice

Scalia adopted not only a crabbed notion of equality, but of compassion.
2. Scalia’s Second Claim: The Windsor Court Was Unduly Harsh In Its
Characterization of the Supporters of DOMA
It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia failed to cite a single example from the
Congressional Record that supported his claim of deliberate concealment by the Court of the
“arguments that exist,” to justify DOMA. Instead, Scalia relies on secondary sources to ground
this missive, declaring, “I imagine …it is harder to maintain the illusion of the Act’s supporters
as unhinged members of a wild-eyed lynch mob when one first describes their views as they see
them.”120 The “they” in this diatribe refers to any supporter, not the Congressional supporters of
DOMA, or even President Clinton.
Let us start with Clinton.
In 1993, President Clinton engaged in a toe-to-toe battle with the Armed Services over
the issue of gay and lesbian soldiers in the military.

The hearings, convened by the Armed

Services Committee, were very difficult to witness for those service men and women who were
homosexuals.

Those testifying claimed that LGB service members were threats to unit

cohesion, and if allowed to join or to remain in the military would cause destruction of U.S.
fighting forces.

Such hyperbole was reminiscent of two prior historic moments—the

desegregation of the Armed Services following WWII and the question of women in combat.
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Because of these hearings, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell

was integrated into the USCMJ,

resulting in a surge of separations from the Armed Services of homosexuals or those perceived to
be homosexuals. Clinton and the Democrats suffered deep political wounds because of President
Clinton’s initial support of allowing gays to serve openly in the military. As reported in the New
York Times, George Stephanopoulos, a senior Presidential adviser said, “[i]t’s wrong for people
to use this issue to demonize gays and lesbians and it’s pretty clear that that was the intent in
trying to create a buzz on this issue. But the fact remains that if the legislation is in accord with
the President’s stated position, he would have no choice but to sign it.”
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Clinton’s stated

position was in opposition to gay marriage, later repudiated in 2013.
Congress on the other hand, led by Newt Gingrich in the House, was apoplectic over the
prospect of gay marriage finding its way into Americana. The first case, Baehr v. Lewin122 was
winding its way through the Hawaii courts and it was just a matter of time before the issue would
be on the front political burner. In 1996, DOMA was proposed, rushed through Congress, and
then signed by the President.

Whilst not a virulent opponent of same- sex marriage, the

President aligned himself with the anti-homosexual cabal in Congress.
Turning to the Congressional Record, it states the following, “it is both appropriate and
necessary for Congress to do what it can to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual
marriage…H.R.3396 is appropriately entitled the Defense of Marriage Act.”
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The House

Report continued, stating, “both moral disapproval of homosexuality and a moral conviction that
heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality” and the
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purpose of DOMA was, “[the] promo[tion] in protecting the traditional moral teachings reflected
in heterosexual marriage laws.” 124
The arguments for DOMA that Scalia claims exist are nowhere to be found in the House
Report, not problems associated with “choice of law”125 nor protection from “unforeseen…
circumstance.”126 Indeed, the choice-of-law issue cited by Justice Scalia was penned in 2012,
sixteen years after DOMA sailed through Congress.

The article, published in Stanford Law

Review, correctly raised issues that could flow from the failure to implement a “uniform federal
definition of marriage,” but that was not questioned, raised, or even hinted by Congressional
members during debate on DOMA. In fact, according to proponents of DOMA, there is a
federal and cultural definition of marriage, which is heterosexual marriage, as scripturally
ordained.
Justice Posner was correct. Scalia cares not at all about “contrary evidence” or facts.
Rather, ideology guides his thinking and frames his dissents.
3. Scalia’s Third Claim: The Will of the People Violated
Scalia’s tethers his last hope of discrediting the Windsor decision to the people. Scalia
claimed that the Court usurped the power of the Legislature by declaring part of DOMA
unconstitutional. 127 As the Peoples’ representative, Congress was acting on our behalf. Whilst
representative democracy permits legislators to act as stand-ins for constituents, this theory of
governance does not override the Constitution.
The Windsor Court outlines with stunning clarity how §3 of DOMA violates the
Constitution. Let us consider this for a moment. What if Congress enacted a law requiring only
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New Yorkers to pay for primary and secondary education via a special federal tax. The rest of
the country would receive federal funds to offset state taxation, thereby lowering state tax rates
whilst still providing free K-12 education. Even with deference given to government enactments
under rational basis, Congress would still need to establish the reasonableness of the law’s
purpose and statutory scheme.

Put another way, a nexus must exist between chosen strategy

(law) and rationale (purpose).
Scalia ignores the role of the Supreme Court in relation to enactment of law and policy,
and dismissed entirely jurisprudence that has addressed this role since the founding. Indeed, the
will of the People and the conduct of the legislature, whether federal or state, is neither above nor
supersedes the Constitution. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Ms. Windsor was
challenging a federal enactment on Constitutional grounds, and the Court responded
appropriately notwithstanding Scalia’s claim to the contrary. As Justice Kennedy observed, “the
power the Constitution grants, it also restrains,”128 a principle Justice Scalia conveniently
ignores.
There is, however, an aberrant quality to Scalia’s invocation of “The People.”
In 2005, Justice Scalia penned the now infamous Castle Rock decision, which did in fact
usurp the will of the People of the State of Colorado.129 In Castle Rock, Scalia wrote that the
Colorado Legislature could not have endorsed mandatory arrest in its 1994 legislation.
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In

opining as he did, Scalia distorted the legislative history of Colorado, dismissed the
Congressional Record regarding the enactment of VAWA, marginalized the history of
mandatory arrest legislation in thirty-two states, and discounted the 1978 and 1984
Congressional Hearings on Domestic Violence, as well as myriad State Court Reports on the
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Status of Women in 1985 and 1995. He deliberately misused the statutory meaning of “shall,”
characterizing it as an invitation to act,131 whilst dismissing over one hundred amicus briefs in
support of the Colorado statute as well as appellant, Jessica Gonzales, relying instead on one
report published by the ABA in 1980.132 In Castle Rock, Justice Scalia not only dismissed the
will of the people of the State of Colorado but the will of the people from thirty–one states where
mandatory arrest was part of law enforcement procedure. Thus, it appears that this claim, as well
as the other two, is purely artifice.
a. And Obergefell?
After Windsor, federal Circuit Courts, as well as State Supreme Courts, issued opinions
striking down state constitutional amendments that restricted marriage to heterosexual couples.
Citing both the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest as well as equality, the Courts located a
fundamental right to marry in the Fourteenth Amendment for adults regardless of the gender of
the parties. Of great importance was the invocation of an equality theory to nullify state statutes
and constitutional amendments that privileged heterosexuality over homosexuality. In rendering
these decisions, the underlying theme was consistent with Windsor.
Justice Scalia got one thing right: Windsor would open the door to full equality
regarding marriage.
On June 26, 2015, two years to the day that Windsor was decided, Justice Kennedy
crafted a response to the dissenting Justices as well as the NO campaign in the States that once
and for all, lesbians and gay men had a fundamental right to marry. Kennedy rejected the claim
that children fare better in homes built upon a heterosexual dyad. The majority recognised the
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gender of one’s parents is irrelevant to children’s cognitive and emotional development. Instead,
the majority held fast to the social science that documented what children need is a stable, loving
home environment.
Kennedy did spend a good deal of column space opining on conceptions of dignity, and
while some pundits dismissed this part of the opinion, it was perhaps one of the most moving
sections. Dispensing with the need for religious approbation, Kennedy stressed the importance
of the dignity and worth of individuals and through marriage, dignity is conferred upon the
individual and the couple. “The majority opined, “fundamental liberties protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain personal choices central to
individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and
beliefs.” By linking dignity, autonomy, and personal identity, the Court affirmed the right of
every individual to determine for herself, her sexual identity and whether marriage, either within
or outside her gender, is a proper choice. This underscored the fundamental nature of sexual
identity to both personhood and personal autonomy.

Moreover, the Court situated sexual

identity and marriage in conceptions of liberty. It should be noted, notwithstanding protestation
by the dissenters, Justice Kennedy, and, derivatively, Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and
Breyer did not fashion a new constitutional right, rather they simply recognised that gay and
lesbian couples should be accorded the same rights as their heterosexual counterparts – the
fundamental right to marry.133
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b. And Justice Scalia?
There were four dissenters in Obergefell, Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Chief
Justice Roberts. All but Justice Scalia raised the issue of freedom of conscience and religious
liberty. It is clear that among the three dissenters, an ideological battle waged, supported by the
Hobby Lobby decision, against the majority. Alito, Thomas, and Roberts conferred a privileged
status upon religious liberty, in effect creating a religious trump card to restrict the liberty and
equality rights of disfavored sexual minorities.

Scalia then did not have to concern himself

explicitly with religion; rather, he could devise a dissent that not only dispensed with historical
context, but distorted fundamental constitutional norms.
Justice Scalia’s dissent was peppered with contempt for his colleagues in the majority.
Erwin Chemerinsky’s was correct when he characterized Scalia’s opinions as mean spirited and
convoluted. In Obergefell, Scalia even surpassed the nit-picking, sarcastic, constitutionally
tortured diatribes that marked his commentary in prior opinions that addressed homosexuality.
Scalia wrote:
Today’s decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans
coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme Court. The
opinion in these cases is the furthest extension in fact—and the furthest
extension one can even imagine—of the Court’s claimed power to create
“liberties” that the Constitution and its Amendments neglect to mention. This
practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine, always
accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of
the most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and
won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.134
What amazes is the utter dishonesty of this one passage. Since Roe v. Wade, Justice
Scalia fulminated over the notion of a right to privacy and conceptions of a fundamental right to
liberty. His main objection is rooted in textualism, a theory of constitutional interpretation that
relies solely upon the intent and lexicon of the drafters or the architects of a document. As
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applied to the U.S. Constitution, Scalia believed that the document is static as opposed to
dynamic. Thus, if the words are not on the page, the ideas they represent hold no quarter. Since
the word privacy is not in the Constitution, the Court is limited in its interpretation of liberty.
Based on Scalia’s adherence to textualism, since privacy is not explicitly linked to conceptions
of liberty, the right does not exist.135
Even at face value, this theory is not only problematic, but frankly ridiculous. The
framers of the Constitution could not have imagined the existence of vehicles, mobile phones,
landline phones, and the Internet. Yet, Fourth Amendment protections are afforded to these
objects because of their use to transmit thoughts, people, and their belongings. Hence, the word
“effects,” in the Fourth Amendment has expanded to include these objects. Justice Scalia was on
board with the interpretation and expansion of effects.
It would be fair to say that the framers had limited knowledge of corporations, especially
privately or publically held corporations. I dare say that the framers never contemplated that
corporations such as those contemplated in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby would be treated as
persons for the purpose of political expression and freedom of conscience. But that is exactly
what the Supreme Court held with regard to political contributions vis-à-vis a form of
expression, as well as refusing to comply with the federal Affordable Care Act based on religious
liberty and freedom of conscience. To say that Scalia’s jurisprudence is at once disingenuous as
well as duplicitous is quite frankly an understatement.
In Reading Law,136 Justice Scalia, along with co-author Bryan A. Garner, produced a
voluminous tome that indeed speaks volumes. The authors reject notions of originalism, instead
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preferring textualism.137

Scalia believed that textual reliance exemplifies an objective

interpretive methodology.138 Since it is objective, it does not implicate ideology or its cousin,
politics. 139 Yet, as Stephen F. Rohde notes, textualism qua textualism is political because it is
conservative.140 Whilst it may be true that text is neither intrinsically liberal nor conservative,
textualism is part of a conservative ideology.141 And while Scalia rejected original intent, he
does rely on meaning, determined by interpretation by “reasonable people,” at the time. 142
Yet, words do not have intrinsic meaning. We know this as we move through the years
using certain words to mean X that once meant Y. As an example, take the word “boss.” At one
time it meant supervisor or superior or command. However if you asked a teenager in 1960 the
meaning of “boss,” it would be altogether different. Meaning is derived from context and
context changes; indeed, the older the text or words, the more remote the “original” meaning.
Reliance on the reasonable person to determine meaning is also problematic. Who is the
reasonable person?

If we freeze time at 1775, the reasonable person would be the reasonable

man—not a generic man. For example, the reasonable man of 1775 would interpret or define
head of household quite differently than the reasonable person of 2016. In the 18th Century, head
of household was male, most likely Caucasian, and part of the landed gentry. Head of household
would have excluded women, thereby stratifying familial power according to gender. Use of
“reasonable person,” regardless of historical moment, is packed with cultural meaning that may
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be constructed along axis of domination. Thus Scalia’s methodology was not only inconsistent,
it did not approximate either objectivity or cultural detachment.
Constitutional interpretation requires more than the intent of framers, or the beliefs of
reasonable men at the time of drafting, or even context. It requires a process that factors into the
juridical equation context-past and present, historical meaning, and faithfulness to moral
imperatives that are foundational to conceptions of justice. The gravamen of conceptions of
justice is the dignity and worth of all individuals, manifest in the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantee of liberty and equality. Religion and ideology are baggage that should be left at the
courthouse door.

Unfortunately, Justice Scalia uses both religious and political ideology to

frame rights discourse. The result not only limits, but extinguishes basic human and political
rights.
c. The Last Word on Obergefell
Obergefell is not only the last case but also the most important. The Court acknowledged
the interlocking nature of liberty and equality in the context of the legal treatment of gays and
lesbians.143 The Court found the challenged laws burdened the liberty of same-sex couples and
abridged central precepts of equality. The marriage laws at issue were in essence unequal.
Same-sex couples were denied benefits afforded opposite-sex couples and barred from
exercising a fundamental right. When the Court recognised the long history of social antipathy
toward gay and lesbian relationships, it found the continued denial of the fundamental right to
marry “work[ed] a grave and continuing harm [that] served to disrespect and subordinate gays
and lesbians.”144 Thus, Obergefell was a seismic shift in both law and culture, displacing
religious heteronormativity whilst reinscribing the centrality of equality. Unfortunately, it is not
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the last word; Hobby Lobby reminds that the struggle for equality, liberty, and autonomy is not
over in the United States.
IV.

THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES: DISAGGREGATING RELIGIOUS
HETERONORMATIVITY, HOMOSEXUALITY AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
America and Ireland, whilst divided by an ocean, are much closer culturally than one

might expect. Religious dogma has framed constitutional, case, statutory, and common law in
both jurisdictions. While America denies the presence of religious dogma in law, such dogma is
readily apparent in the writings of Antonin Scalia and his brethren that came before and currently
share the bench.
The cultural and legal position of the NO constituency in Ireland and the NO politicians,
religious leaders, and jurists in the United States, threaten not only conceptions of equality, but
of liberty. Moreover, the application of religion in law threatens conceptions of gender equality.
The Christian heteronormative roots run deep. Regardless of iteration, Christianity has
created a link between gender hierarchy and moral theology concerning sex, sexual expression,
marriage, and conceptions of family. The primary arguments derive from what is known as the
“natural-law tradition” of ethical thought, beginning with Plato and Aristotle, and continuing
through Thomas Aquinas and other medieval and modern philosophers. Yet, Thomas Aquinas
made the most influential formulation of a natural law theory of sexuality. Integrating an
Aristotelian approach with Christian theology, Aquinas emphasized the centrality of the
distinctive goods of marriage, primarily love, companionship, and legitimate offspring. For
Aquinas, sexual intimacy within marriage was morally permissible and even good. For a sex act
to be moral however, the act must be procreant.145 For it to be procreant there must be “natural”
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insemination, which quite clearly rules out non-procreative heterosexual sexual conduct146 and
clearly homosexual sexual intimacy.
21st Century Thomistic natural law theorists approach the issue of sex and marriage by
invoking the notion of “natural fulfilment” of sexual acts. “Natural” is synonymous with male
and female and “fulfilment” is identical to reproduction. Procreation is at the centre of what is
treated as morally permissible. The 21st Century Thomists narrowed Aquinas’s list of the social
and moral goods by jettisoning conceptions of love and companionship as integral to marriage
and sexual intimacy. By privileging procreation, modern natural law theorists preclude inclusion
of same-sex couples within a marriage paradigm. On the other hand, if love and companionship
are distinct social and moral goods, then barring same-sex couples from marriage would be
problematic.
Exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage requires both privileging procreant sex and
the male and female dyad. If Christian moral theology, as shaped by Aquinas and current natural
law theorists, has structured the “no” platform, then proponents of anti-same-sex marriage are
taking decisive steps to dismantle the wall that separates Church and State. Additionally, where
equality is subordinate to religious belief, there is a real danger that equality will be displaced by
religious canon.
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A. Constructing a Rights Paradigm that Centralises Equality and Reflects a Rights
Discourse that Neither Primatizes nor Privileges Religious Belief
1. Equality qua Equality
Equality as a legal concept is not a stable element. Rather, it is a loaded and highly
contested concept.

Since the Magna Carta Libertatum and the French and American

Revolutions, equality has been a guiding principle for the body politic; in this respect, it is at
present probably the most controversial of the great social ideals.

There is controversy

concerning the precise notion of equality, the relation of justice and equality, the material
requirements and measure of the ideal of equality, the extension of equality, and its status within
a comprehensive theory of justice.147 With the resurgence of religious hegemony in Ireland and
America, conceptions of equality are challenged further by claims of religious liberty and
freedom of conscience asserted by opponents to same-sex marriage. There are, in fact, a myriad
of notions as to the constitutive principles of equality, including formal, proportional, moral, and
the presumption of equality.148 Each theory is bound by specific rules and expectations, and
founded upon basic principles.

In the U.S. and Ireland however, the leading theory is

formalism.
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Formal equality focuses on sameness and difference; like objects ought to be similarly
treated, while objects marked by difference may be treated differently.

When thinking of

sameness and difference, the adage about “apples and oranges” comes to mind. The formalist
would view these objects as distinctly different and, therefore, subject to different treatment.
Critics of formalism would claim the objects are in fact similar, and any perceived differences
are irrelevant. Here sameness derives from the category, “fruit,” while difference marked by
colour and perhaps size. This may seem as if legal theorists are splitting hairs, however, the
sameness and difference dichotomy is critical not only to how we define equality, but also the
judicial standard of review employed to assess the presence, or absence, of inequality. With
formal equality, the characterization of the object will determine whether sameness or difference
is triggered. Consequently, legal outcome is tied to how one defines the “thing” that has been
burdened or benefitted.
Formalised equality is problematic in the same-sex marriage debate in the same way as
the apple and orange example. While heterosexuals and homosexuals share the same “race,”
there are differences when it comes to the procreative capability of each subset of humankind.
There is, however, another problem; how we define the nature of the inequality claimed. If
marriage is about procreation, following modern natural law as well as Aquinan theory,
sameness is impossible because the operational definition of marriage is linked to biology. Once
a difference is located, unequal treatment may not violate conceptions of equality. Structuring
the affected classes is inextricably linked to the operational definition of the right denied, or the
responsibility imposed.

If the cultural definition of marriage shifts from procreation to love and

companionship, biological difference becomes irrelevant, thus barring homosexual marriage
would violate notions of formal equality.

43

Formal equality creates theoretical gerrymandering while diminishing the importance of
difference. A theory is required that neither diminishes nor sublimates difference, but rather
accounts for human variation whether such variation is based on, inter alia, race, sex, gender
identity, or sexual orientation.

Moreover, in structuring an equality paradigm, socially

constructed hierarchies are neither emancipatory nor democratic, because such hierarchies
particularize and subordinate parts of the self. As Patricia Williams noted, we are the sum of our
parts and there are times when particularities converge or diverge, depending on the social
environment. For instance, homosexuality may be significant if social factors create either a
burden or benefit connected to sexual orientation. On the other hand, race, gender, and sexual
orientation may conflate under circumstances such as sexual assault. Barbara Smith reminded of
both the particularity and generality of identity when she claimed, “[w]hen I was raped, my
blackness, gender and lesbianism all converged in that moment.” Indeed, the perils of reducing
anything “to a single story,”149 as formalized equality tends to do, not only flattens the
topography of the self but creates a “one-dimensional man.”150
The distribution of a social good, such as marriage, premised upon sex, race, or any other
“ism,” produces the same harm. An equality theory that accounts for difference, privileges, and
the full expanse of human experience, requires rejection of both the “hierarchy of oppression”
and the sliding scale for judicial review. Moreover, it is a theory that does justice to who we are
–the sum of our parts.
V.

CONCLUSION
The YES Campaign in Ireland and the Freedom to Marry Campaign in the U.S.

embraced different strategies to accomplish their goals. In doing so, they represent the notion
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2009),

that there is not one road or option to achieve equality. Marriage Equality was the first step in
dismantling second-class citizenship for sexual minorities. Yet, as Hobby Lobby in the United
States and the position of radical religious conservatives in both jurisdictions illustrate, the
battle is far from over. Inequality in housing, employment, social services and fundamental
human rights, is at once prevalent and in some quarters of the U.S. and Ireland very much
alive. What is required is a system of laws premised upon the centrality of equality and not the
primacy of religion. As Howard Zinn reminds, there is no such thing as neutrality; rather, we
either shall adhere to conceptions of gender equality and rights for sexual minorities or we
shall not. There is no middle course or ground. The Freedom Train is here, it is moving, and
it is up to scholar and activist alike to bring it home: where equality and liberty are the
province of us all.
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